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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new model for pricing OTC derivatives subject to collateralization. It
allows for collateral posting adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, the model can back out the market
price of a collateralized contract. This framework is very useful for valuing outstanding derivatives. Using
a unique dataset, we find empirical evidence that credit risk alone is not overly important in determining
credit-related spreads. Only accounting for both collateral arrangement and credit risk can sufficiently
explain unsecured credit costs. This finding suggests that failure to properly account for collateralization
may result in significant mispricing of derivatives. We also empirically gauge the impact of collateral
agreements on risk measurements. Our findings indicate that there are important interactions between
market and credit risk.

Key words: collateralization, asset pricing, plumbing of financial system, swap premium spread, CVA,
VaR, interaction between market and credit risk
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Collateral arrangements are regulated by the Credit Support Annex (CSA) and are always counterpartybased as different counterparties may have different CSA agreements. Thus, financial institutions
normally group derivatives into counterparty portfolios first and then process them separately. The
difference between counterparties is determined by counterparty credit qualities whereas the difference in
collateralization is distinguished by the terms and conditions of CSA agreements.
Collateralization is a critical component of the plumbing of the financial system. The use of
collateral in financial markets has increased sharply over the past decade, yet analytical and empirical
research on collateralization is relatively sparse. The effect of collateralization on valuation and risk is an
understudied area.
Due to the complexity of collateralization, the literature seems to turn away from direct and
detailed modeling. For example, Johannes and Sundaresan [2007], and Fuijii and Takahahsi [2012] model
collateralization via a cost-of-collateral instantaneous rate. Piterbarg [2010] regards collateral as a regular
asset and uses the replication approach to price collateralized derivatives.
Contrary to previous studies, we present a model that characterizes a collateral process directly
based on the fundamental principal and legal structure of CSA. The model is devised that allows for
collateralization adhering to bankruptcy laws. As such, it can back out price changes due to counterparty
risk and collateral posting. Our model is very useful for valuing off-the-run or outstanding derivatives.
This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of collateralization by
addressing several essential questions. First, how does collateralization affect swap rate?
Interest rate swaps collectively account for two-thirds of all outstanding derivatives. An ISDA
mid-market swap rate is based on a mid-day polling. Dealers use this market rate as a reference and make
some adjustments to quote an actual swap rate. The adjustment or swap premium is determined by many
factors, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, funding cost, operational cost and expected profit, etc.
Unlike generic mid-market swap rates, swap premia are determined in a competitive market
according to the basic principles of supply and demand. A swap client first contacts a number of swap
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dealers for a quotation and then chooses the most competitive one. If a premium is too low, the dealer
may lose money. If a premium is too high, the dealer may lose the competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, we do not know the detailed allocation of a swap premium, i.e., what percentage
of the adjustment is charged for each factor. Thus, a direct empirical assessment of the impact of
collateralization on swap rate is impossible.
To circumvent this difficulty, this article uses an indirect empirical approach. We define a swap
premium spread as the premium difference between two swap contracts that have exactly the same terms
and conditions but are traded with different CSA counterparties. We reasonably believe that if two
contracts are identical except counterparties, the swap premium spread should reflect counterparty credit
risk only, as all other risks/costs are identical.
Empirically, we obtain a unique proprietary dataset from an investment bank. We use these data
and a statistical measurement R 2 to examine whether credit risk and collateralization, alone or in
combination, are sufficient to explain market swap premium spreads. We first study the marginal impact
of credit risk. Since credit default swap (CDS) premium theoretically reflects the credit risk of a firm, we
use the market swap premium spreads as the response variable and the CDS premium differences between
two counterparties as the explanatory variable. The estimation result shows that the adjusted R 2 is 0.7472,
implying that approximately 75% of market spreads can be explained by counterparty credit risk. In other
words, counterparty risk alone can provide a good but not overwhelming prediction on spreads.
We then assess the joint effect. Because implied or model-generated spreads take into account
both counterparty risk and collateralization, we assign the model-implied spreads as the explanatory
variable and the market spreads as the response variable. The new adjusted R 2 is 0.9906, suggesting that
counterparty risk and collateralization together have high explanatory power on premium spreads. The
finding leads to practical implications, such as collateralization modeling allows forecasting credit spread.
Second, how does collateralization affect counterparty credit risk? Credit value adjustment (CVA)
is the most prominent measurement in counterparty credit risk. We select all the CSA counterparty
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portfolios in the dataset and then compute their CVAs. We find that the CVA of a collateralized
counterparty portfolio is always smaller than the one of the same portfolio without collateralization. We
also find that credit risk is negatively correlated with collateralization as an increase in collateralization
causes a decrease in credit risk. The empirical tests corroborate our theoretical conclusions that
collateralization can reduce CVA charges and mitigate counterparty risk.
Finally, how do collateralization and credit risk, either alone or in combination, impact market
risk? How do they interact with each other? Value at risk (VaR) is the regulatory measurement for market
risk We compute VaR in three different cases – VaR without taking credit risk into account, VaR with
credit risk, and VaR with both credit risk and collateralization. We find that there is a positive correlation
between market risk and credit risk as VaR increases after considering counterparty credit risk. We also
find that collateralization and market risk have a negative correlation, i.e., collateral posting can actually
reduce VaR. This finding contradicts the prevailing belief in the market that collateralization would
increase market risk (see Collateral Management – Wikipedia).
The rest of this article is organized as follows: First we present a new model for pricing
collateralized financial derivatives. Then we discuss empirical evidences. Finally, the conclusions and
discussion are provided. All proofs and detailed derivations are contained in the appendices.

Pricing Collateralized Financial Derivatives
A CSA is a legal document that regulates collateral posting. It specifies a variety of terms
including threshold, independent amount, and minimum transfer amount (MTA). A threshold is the
unsecured credit exposure that a party is willing to bear. A MTA is used to avoid the workload associated
with a frequent transfer of insignificant collateral amounts. An independent amount plays the same role as
an initial margin or haircut. We define the effective collateral threshold as the threshold plus the MTA.
Collateral is called as soon as the mark-to-market (MTM) value rises above the effective threshold.
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There are three types of collateralization: partial, over or full. A positive effective threshold
corresponds to partial-collateralization where the posting of collateral is less than the MTM value. A
negative effective threshold represents over-collateralization where the posting of collateral is greater than
the MTM value. A zero-value effective threshold equates with full-collateralization where the posting of
collateral is equal to the MTM value. Our generic model is applicable to all the types.
Since the only reason for taking collateral is to reduce/eliminate credit risk, collateral analysis
should be closely related to credit risk modeling. There are two primary types of models that attempt to
describe default processes in the literature: structural models and reduced-form models. Many
practitioners in the market have tended to gravitate toward the reduced-from models given their
mathematical tractability and market consistency.
We consider a filtered probability space (  , F , Ft t 0 , P ) satisfying the usual conditions,
where  denotes a sample space, F denotes a  -algebra, P denotes a probability measure, and

Ft t 0 denotes a filtration. In the reduced-form framework, the stopping or default time  of a firm is
modeled as a Cox arrival process whose first jump occurs at default and is defined by,



t

  inf t :  h( s, s )ds  
0



(1)

where h (t ) or h(t , t ) denotes the stochastic hazard rate dependent on an exogenous common state t ,
and  is a unit exponential random variable independent of t .
It is well-known that the survival probability from time t to s in this framework is defined by
s
p(t , s) : P(  s |   t )  exp   h(u )du 
 t


(2a)

The default probability for the period (t, s) is given by
s
q(t , s) : P(  s |   t )  1  p(t , s)  1  exp   h(u )du 
 t


(2b)

Let valuation date be t. Consider a financial contract that promises to pay a X T  0 at maturity
date T  t , and nothing before the time.
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The binomial default rule considers only two possible states: default or survival. For a discrete
one-payment period (t, T ) economy, at time T the contract either defaults with the default probability

q (t , T ) or survives with the survival probability p (t , T ) . The survival payoff is equal to X T and the
default payoff is a fraction of X T : X T , where  is the recovery rate. The value of this defaultable
contract at time t is the discounted expectation of all the possible payoffs and is given by

V N (t )  ED(t , T ) p(t , T )   (T )q(t , T )X T Ft   ED(t , T ) I (t , T ) X T Ft 

(3)

where E  F t  is the expectation conditional on Ft , D(t , T ) denotes the risk-free discount factor at time
t for maturity T and I (t , T )   p(t , T )   (T )q(t , T ) can be regarded as a risk-adjusted discount ratio.
Suppose that there is a CSA agreement between a bank and a counterparty in which the
counterparty is required to deliver collateral when the mark-to-market (MTM) value arises over the
effective threshold H.
The choice of modeling assumptions for collateralization should be based on the legal structure of
CSA. According to the Bankruptcy Law, if the demand for default payment exceeds the collateral value,
the balance of the demand will be treated as an unsecured claim and subject to its pro rate distribution
under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme (see Garlson [1992], Routh and Douglas [2005], and
Edwards and Morrison [2005]). The default payment under a CSA can be mathematically expressed as

P D (T )  C (T )   (T ) X T  C (T )    (T ) X T  C (T )(1   (T ))

(4)

where C (T ) is the collateral amount at T.
It is worth noting that the default payment in equation (4) is always greater than the original
recovery, i.e., P D (T )   (T ) X T because  (T ) is always less than 1. Said differently, the default payoff of
a collateralized contract is always greater than the default payoff of the same contract without a CSA.
That is why the major benefit of collateralization should be viewed as an improved recovery in the event
of a default.
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According to CSA, if the contract value V C (t ) is less than the effective threshold H (t ) , no
collateral is posted; otherwise, the required collateral is equal to the difference between the contract value
and the effective threshold. The collateral amount posted at time t can be expressed mathematically as

C (t )  max(V C (t )  H (t ), 0)

(5)

where H (t )  0 corresponds to full-collateralization; H (t )  0 represents partial-collateralization; and
H (t )  0 reflects over-collateralization.

For a discrete one-payment period (t, T) economy, at time T, if the contract survives, the survival
value is the promised payoff X T and the collateral taker returns the collateral to the provider. If the
contract defaults, the default payment is defined in (4) where the future value of the collateral is
C (T )  C (t ) / D(t , T ) . Since the most predominant form of collateral is cash according to ISDA [2013], it

is reasonable to consider the time value of money only for collateral assets. The large use of cash means
that collateral is both liquid and not subject to large fluctuations in value. The above collateral rule tells us
that collateral does not have any bearing on survival payoffs; instead, it takes effect on default payments
only. The value of the CSA contract is the discounted expectation of all the payoffs and is given by
V C (t )  ED(t , T )q(t , T )C (T )   (T )( X T  C (T ))  p(t , T ) X T  Ft



(6)

After some simple mathematics, we have the following proposition
Proposition 1: The value of a collateralized single-payment contract is given by





(7a)



(7b)

V C (t )  E F (t , T ) X T Ft  G (t , T )
where



F (t, T )  1V N (t ) H (t )  1V N (t )H (t ) / I (t, T ) I (t , T ) D(t, T )

G(t , T )  1V N (t )H (t ) H (t )q (t , T )1   (T ) / I (t , T )

(7c)

where I (t , T )  E I (t , T ) Ft  . I (t , T ) and V N (t ) are defined in (3).
Proof: See the Appendix.
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We may think of F (t , T ) as the CSA-adjusted discount factor and G(t , T ) as the cost of bearing
unsecured credit risk. Proposition 1 tells us that the value of a collateralized contract is equal to the
present value of the payoff discounted by the CSA-adjusted discount factor minus the cost of taking
unsecured counterparty credit risk. This proposition theoretically demonstrates that collateral posting
changes valuation.
The pricing in Proposition 1 is relatively straightforward. We first compute V N (t ) and then test
whether its value is greater than H (t ) . After that, the calculations of F (t , T ) , G(t , T ) and V C (t ) are
easily obtained.
We discuss a special case where H (t )  0 corresponding to full-collateralization. Suppose that
default probabilities are uncorrelated with interest rates and payoffs2. From Proposition 1, we can easily
obtain V C (t )  V F (t ) where V F (t )  ED(t , T ) X T Ft

 is the risk-free value. That is to say: the value of a

fully-collateralized contract is equal to the risk-free value. This conclusion is in line with the results of
Johannes and Sundaresan [2007], Fuijii and Takahahsi [2012], and Piterbarg [2010].
Proposition 1 can be easily extended from single payment to multiple payments. Suppose that a
defaultable contract has m cash flows represented as X i with payment dates Ti , where i = 1,…,m. We
derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2: The value of a collateralized multiple-payment contract is given by



i 1







m 1



i 1





V C (t )  i 1 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) X i Ft  i 0 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) G (Ti , Ti 1 ) Ft
m



(8a)

where





F (T j , T j 1 )  1J (T j ,T j 1 )H (T j )  1J (T j ,T j 1 ) H (T j ) / I (T j , T j 1 ) I (T j , T j 1 ) D(T j , T j 1 )

2

(8b)

Moody’s Investor’s Service [2000] presents statistics that suggest that the correlations between interest

rates, default probabilities and recovery rates are very small and provides a reasonable comfort level for
the uncorrelated assumption.
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G(T j , T j 1 )  1J (T j ,T j 1 )H (T j ) H (T j )q (T j , T j 1 ) 1   (T j 1 ) / I (T j , T j 1 )





J (T j , T j 1 )  E  D(T j , T j 1 ) I (T j , T j 1 ) V C (T j 1 )  X j 1 FT j 



where



i 1
j 0

(8c)

(8d)

F (T j , T j 1 )  1 is an empty product when i  0 . Empty product allows for a much shorter

mathematical presentation of many subjects.
The valuation in Proposition 2 has a backward nature. The intermediate values are vital to
determine the final price. For a payment period, the current price has a dependence on the future price.
Only on the final payment date Tm , the value of the contract and the maximum amount of information
needed to determine J (Tm1 , Tm ) , F (Tm1 , Tm ) and G(Tm1 , Tm ) are revealed. This type of problem can be
best solved by working backward in time, with the later value feeding into the earlier ones, so that the
process builds on itself in a recursive fashion, which is referred to as backward induction. The most
popular backward induction algorithms are lattice/tree and regression-based Monte Carlo.

Empirical Results
Impact of collateralization on swap rate
In this subsection, we choose interest rate swaps for our empirical study. Ultimately, it is the
objective of this subsection to test if counterparty credit risk and collateralization are sufficient to explain
market swap premium spreads. We choose a statistical measurement R 2 to determine how much market
spreads can be interpreted by model-implied spreads that take counterparty risk and collateralization into
account.
Due to a close relationship, any statistical software that performs linear regression analysis will
outputs R 2 value. Thus, conveniently we report R 2 together with other regression results that may
provide additional statistical and financial insights.
Swap rate is the fixed rate that sets the market value of a swap at initiation to zero. ISDAFIX
provides average mid-market swap rates based on a mid-day polling from a panel of dealers. In practice,
8

the mid-market swap rates are generally not the actual swap rates transacted with counterparties, but are
instead the benchmarks against which the actual swap rates are set. A swap dealer that arranges a contract
and provides liquidity to the market involves costs. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the mid-market
swap rate to cover various transacting expenses and also to provide a profit margin to the dealer. As a
result, the actual price agreed for a transaction is not zero but a positive amount to the dealer.
Unlike the generic benchmark swap rates, swap premia are determined according to the basic
principles of supply and demand. The swap market is highly competitive. In a competitive market, prices
are determined by the impersonal forces of demand and supply, but not by the manipulations of powerful
buyers or sellers.
Prior research has primarily focused on the generic mid-market swap rates and results appear
puzzling. Sorensen and Bollier [1994] believe that swap spreads are partially determined by counterparty
default risk. Whereas Duffie and Huang [1996], Minton [1997] and Grinblatt [2001] find weak or no
evidence of the impact of counterparty credit risk on swap spreads. Collin-Dufresne and Solnik [2001]
and He [2001] further argue that many credit enhancement devices, e.g., collateralization, have essentially
rendered swap contracts risk-free. Meanwhile, Duffie and Singleton [1999], and Liu, Longstaff and
Mandell [2006] conclude that both credit and liquidity risks have an impact on swap spreads. Moreover,
Feldhutter and Lando [2008] find that the liquidity factor is the largest component of swap spreads. It
seems that there is no clear-cut answer yet regarding the relative contribution of various factors.
In contrast to previous research, this subsection mainly studies swap adjustments/premia related
to credit risk and collateralization. It empirically measures the effect of collateralization on pricing and
compares it with model-implied prices.
A swap premium is supposed to cover the expected profit and all the expenses, including the cost
of bearing unsecured credit risk. Unfortunately, however, we do not know what percentage of the market
swap premium is allocated to the unsecured credit risk, which makes a direct verification impossible.
To circumvent this difficulty, we design an indirect verification process in which we select some
CSA swap pairs such that the two contracts in each pair have exactly the same terms and conditions but
9

are traded with different counterparties under different collateral agreements. It is reasonable to believe
that the difference between the two contracts in each pair is solely attributed to collateralized counterparty
credit risk, as all the other risks/costs are identical. Therefore, by accounting for credit risk and
collateralization, we can efficiently compare the implied spreads with the market spreads for these pairs.
We obtain a unique proprietary dataset from FinPricing (FinPricing 2017). The dataset contains
derivative contract data, counterparty data (including collateral agreements, recovery rates, etc), and
market data. The trading dates are from May 6, 2005 to May 11, 2012. We find a total of 1002 swap pairs
in the dataset, where the two contracts in each pair have the same terms and conditions but are traded with
different CSA counterparties. We arbitrarily select one pair shown in Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 1: A pair of 20-year swap contracts
This exhibit displays the terms and conditions of two swap contracts that have different counterparties but
are otherwise the same. We hide the counterparty names according to the security policy of the
investment bank while everything else is authentic.
Swap 1
Fixed leg
Counterparty

Swap 2

Floating leg

Fixed leg

X

Floating leg
Y

Effective date

15/09/2005

15/09/2005

15/09/2005

15/09/2005

Maturity date

15/09/2025

15/09/2025

15/09/2025

15/09/2025

Day count

30/360

ACT/360

30/360

ACT/360

Payment frequency

Semi-annually

Quarterly

Semi-annually

Quarterly

Swap rate

4.9042%

-

4.9053%

-

Roll over

Mod_follow

Mod_follow

Mod_follow

Mod_follow

Principal

25,000,000

25,000,000

25,000,000

25,000,000

Currency

USD

USD

USD

USD

Pay/receive

Bank receives

Party X receives

Bank receives

Party Y receives

10

Floating index

-

3 month LIBOR

-

3 month LIBOR

Floating spread

-

0

-

0

Floating reset

-

Quarterly

-

Quarterly

An interest rate curve is the term structure of interest rates, derived from observed market
instruments that represent the most liquid and dominant interest rate products for certain time horizons.
Normally the curve is divided into three parts. The short end of the term structure is determined using
LIBOR rates. The middle part of the curve is constructed using Eurodollar futures. The far end is derived
using mid swap rates. The LIBOR-future-swap curve is presented in Exhibit 2. After bootstrapping the
curve, we get the continuously compounded zero rates.

Exhibit 2: USD LIBOR-future-swap curve
This exhibit displays the closing mid prices as of September 15, 2005
Instrument Name

Price

September 21 2005 LIBOR

3.6067%

September 2005 Eurodollar 3 month

96.1050

December 2005 Eurodollar 3 month

95.9100

March 2006 Eurodollar 3 month

95.8100

June 2006 Eurodollar 3 month

95.7500

September 2006 Eurodollar 3 month

95.7150

December 2006 Eurodollar 3 month

95.6800

2 year swap rate

4.2778%

3 year swap rate

4.3327%

4 year swap rate

4.3770%

5 year swap rate

4.4213%

6 year swap rate

4.4679%
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7 year swap rate

4.5120%

8 year swap rate

4.5561%

9 year swap rate

4.5952%

10 year swap rate

4.6368%

12 year swap rate

4.7089%

15 year swap rate

4.7957%

20 year swap rate

4.8771%

25 year swap rate

4.9135%

As the payoffs of an interest rate swap are determined by interest rates, we need to model the
evolution of floating rates. Interest rate models are based on evolving either short rates, instantaneous
forward rates, or market forward rates. Since both short rates and instantaneous forward rates are not
directly observable in the market, the models based on these rates have difficulties in expressing market
views and quotes, and lack agreement with market valuation formulas for basic derivatives. On the other
hand, the object modeled under the Libor Market Model (LMM) is market-observable. It is also
consistent with the market standard approach for pricing caps/floors using Black’s formula. They are
generally considered to have more desirable theoretical calibration properties than short rate or
instantaneous forward rate models. Therefore, we choose the LMM lattice proposed by Xiao [2011] for
pricing collateralized swaps.
According to Proposition 2, we also need counterparty-related information, such as recovery rates,
hazard rates and collateral thresholds. The CDS premia and recovery rates are given in Exhibit 3 and the
collateral thresholds and MTAs of the CSA agreements are displayed in Exhibit 4. We can compute the
hazard rates via a standard calibration process (see J.P. Morgan [2001]).

Exhibit 3: CDS premia and recovery rates
This exhibit displays the closing CDS premia as of September 15, 2005 and recovery rates

12

Counterparty name

Bank

Company X

Company Y

6 month CDS spread

0.00031

0.000489

0.000808

1 year CDS spread

0.000333

0.00056

0.001017

2 year CDS spread

0.000516

0.000866

0.00154

3 year CDS spread

0.000664

0.001147

0.002114

4 year CDS spread

0.000848

0.00147

0.002768

5 year CDS spread

0.001012

0.001783

0.003439

7 year CDS spread

0.001334

0.002289

0.004283

10 year CDS spread

0.001727

0.002952

0.005281

15 year CDS spread

0.001907

0.003283

0.005814

20 year CDS spread

0.002023

0.003266

0.006064

30 year CDS spread

0.002021

0.00336

0.006461

Recovery rate

0.39213

0.35847

0.33872

Exhibit 4: CSA agreement
This exhibit provides the collateral thresholds and MTAs under the CSA agreements.
CSA agreement

1

2

Counterparty name

Bank

Company X

Bank

Company Y

Threshold

0

0

0

0

MTA

500000

500000

500000

500000

Given the above information, we are able to compute the collateralized swap rates. We first use
the LMM to evolve the interest rates and then determine the associated CSA-adjusted discount factors as
well as the cost of bearing unsecured credit risk according to Proposition 2. Finally, we calculate the
collateralized swap rates via a backward induction method. The results are given in Exhibit 5.
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Exhibit 5: Swap rate results
This exhibit presents the model-implied swap rates and premia as well as the dealer-quoted market swap
rates and premia, where Swap premium (in bps) = Swap rate – Generic swap rate, and Premium spread =
Premium of swap 2 – Premium of swap 1.
Swap 1

Swap 2

Generic
Premium spread
swap rate

Swap rate

Premium

Swap rate

Premium

Model-implied

0.048780

0.09 bps

0.048790

0.19 bps

0.10 bps

Dealer quoted

0.049042

2.71 bps

0.049053

2.82 bps

0.11 bps

0.048771

The 20-year generic mid-market swap rate is 0.048771 shown in Exhibit 2. The swap rates of
contracts 1 and 2 are given in Exhibit 1 as 0.049042 and 0.049053. Accordingly, the market swap premia
are 2.71 (0.049042 - 0.048771) basis points (bps) and 2.82 (0.049053 - 0.048771) bps. These premia are
charged for many expenses. Although we do not know what percentage of the premia are allocated to
cover the unsecured credit risks, we reasonably believe that the market premium spread, 0.11 (= 2.82 –
2.71) bps in Exhibit 5, should solely reflect the difference between the two counterparties’ unsecured
credit risks, as other factors are identical.
By accounting for both credit risk and collateralization, we calculate the model-implied swap
rates as 0.048780 and 0.048790 shown in Exhibit 5. Consequently, the model-implied swap premia are
0.09 bps and 0.19 bps. The results imply that only a small portion of a swap premium is attributed to
unsecured credit risk. Intuitively the small impact of credit risk and collateral posting on a swap premium
is mainly due to 1) only the swap coupons rather than the national amount are exposed to counterparty
risk; 2) the initial swap rate sets the contract value close to zero and there is only 50% chance to develop
counterpart risk; 3) collateralization mitigates credit risk. This would certainly not be the case for other
derivatives. The result is in line with the findings of Duffie and Huang [1996], Duffie and Singleton
[1999], and Minton [1997].
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Exhibit 5 shows that the model-implied spread is quite close to the dealer-quoted spread,
suggesting that the model is fairly accurate in pricing collateralized financial instruments.
Repeating this exercise for the remaining pairs, we find that the model-implied spreads fluctuate
randomly around the market spreads. We refer to the differences between the model-implied premium
spreads and the market quoted premium spreads as the model-market premium spread differentials. The
summary statistics of the market spreads, the model-implied spreads, and the model-market spread
differentials are presented in Exhibit 6. It shows that the average of the model-market spread differentials
is only -0.03 bps, which can be partly attributed to noise. The results indicate prima facie that the model
performs quite well. The empirical tests corroborate the theoretical prediction on premium spreads.

Exhibit 6: Summary statistics of model-implied swap premium spreads, market swap premium
spreads and model-market swap premium spread differentials
All values are displayed in bps. Model-market swap premium spread differential = Model-implied swap
premium spread – Market-quoted swap premium spread.
Max

Min

Mean

Median

Std

Market quoted swap premium spreads

3.08

-5.25

-0.46

-0.15

1.80

Model-implied swap premium spreads

2.10

-5.33

-0.44

0.03

1.73

Model-market premium spread differentials

0.99

-1.18

-0.03

0.05

0.46

Next, we examine the effects of credit risk and collateralization, alone or combined, on swap
premium spreads. First, we study the marginal effect of credit risk. For each swap pair, we obtain the
counterparty CDS premia. Presumably, the differences in CDS premia should mainly represent the
differences in counterparty risk. To determine the strength of the statistical relationship between market
premium spreads and counterparty risk, we present the estimate of the following regression model.

Y  a  bX  

(9)
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where Y is the market swap premium spread, X is the difference between the counterparty CDS premia, a
is the intercept, b is the slope, and  is the regression residual.
The results of this regression are shown in Exhibit 7. It can be seen that the adjusted R 2 is 0.7472,
implying that approximately 74% of market premium spreads can be explained by credit risk alone. We
provide empirical evidence that counterparty credit risk alone plays a significant but not overwhelming
role in determining credit-related spreads when contracts are under collateral agreements. Moreover, the
slope is 0.0127, suggesting that a CDS spread of about 100 bps translates into a swap spread of about 1.27
bps. Finally the small p-value indicates that the changes in CDS premia are closely related to the changes
in market premium spreads.

Exhibit 7: Marginal credit risk regression results
This exhibit presents the regression results for the following regression model:
MarketSwapPremiumSpreads = a + b * DifferencesBetweenCounterpartyCDSs + ε
where the market swap premium spreads are used as the dependent variable and the differences between
the counterparty CDS premia as the explanatory variable.
Slope

Intercept

0.0127

-2.7E-04

Adjusted
0.7472

R2

Significance F

T value

P value

1.1E-05

18.6

1.51E-66

According to ISDA Margin Survey (ISDA [2013], 73.7% of OTC derivatives are subject to
collateral agreements. For large firms, the figure is 80.7%. Accounting for collateralization has become
increasingly important in pricing OTC derivatives. Since the implied spreads generated by our model take
into account both credit risk and collateralization, the statistical relationship between the market spreads
and the model-implied spreads should refer to the joint effect of counterparty credit risk and
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collateralization on market spreads. Thus, we present another regression model where the market spreads
are regressed on the implied spreads. The regression results are shown in Exhibit 8.

Exhibit 8: Credit risk and collateralization combined regression results
This exhibit presents the regression results for the following regression model:
MarketSwapPremiumSpreads = a + b * ImpliedSwapPremiumSpreads + ε
where the market swap premium spreads are used as the dependent variable and the model-implied swap
premium spreads as the explanatory variable.
Slope

Intercept

0.9857

4.48E-05

Adjusted

R2

0.9906

Significance F

T value

P value

3.21E-08

25.4

3.16E-110

Exhibit 8 shows that the adjusted R 2 value is 0.9906, implying that approximately 99% of the
market spreads can be explained by the implied spreads. Also the small p-value suggests that the changes
in implied spreads are strongly related to the changes in market spreads.
The empirical results shed light on the economic and statistical significance of collateralization.
The increase in the explanatory power of swap premium spreads bears an interesting finding: It seems that
credit risk alone has a modest explanatory power on premium spreads. Only the combination of credit risk
and collateralization can sufficiently explain them.

Impact of collateralization on credit risk
In this subsection, we study how collateralization affects credit risk by measuring CVA changes
due to collateral posting. CVA is the market price of counterparty credit risk that has become a central
part of counterparty credit risk management.
From the same dataset above, we find that there are a total of 3052 counterparties having live
trades as of May 11, 2012. 516 of them have CSA agreements. We randomly select one counterparty
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portfolio that contains 476 interest rate swaps, 36 interest rate swaptions and 223 interest rate caps/floors.
First, we compute the risk-free value V F  2,737,702 that is relatively straightforward as the risk-free
portfolio value is what trading systems or pricing models normally report.
Second, we assume that there is counterparty credit risk but no collateral agreement. Based on the
pricing model proposed by Xiao [2015], we compute the risky value of the portfolio as

V N  2,688,014 after considering counterparty credit risk. By definition, the CVA without
collateralization is equal to CVAN  V F  V N  49,688.
Next, we further assume that there is a CSA agreement in which the threshold is 2 million and the
MTA is 100,000. The risky value of the portfolio is calculated as V C  2,725,094 according to
Proposition 2. The CVA with collateralization is given by CVAC  V F  V C  12,608 . Similarly, we
can compute the CVAs under different collateral arrangements and present the results in Exhibit 9.

Exhibit 9. Impact of Collateralization on CVA
This exhibit shows that CVA increases with collateral threshold. The infinite collateral threshold is
equivalent to no collateral agreement and the zero-value collateral threshold corresponds to full
collateralization. An increase in collateral threshold leads to a decrease in collateralization.
Effective Threshold

0

2.1 Million

4.1 Million

6.1 Million

8.1 Mil

Infinite (  )

CVA

0

12,608

23,685

33,504

42,254

49,688

Exhibit 9 tells us that collateral posting can reduce CVA. Full collateralization makes a portfolio
appear to be risk-free. An increase in collateral threshold leads to a rise in unsecured credit exposure, and
thereby an increase in CVA. In particular, CVA reaches the maximum when the threshold is infinite
representing no collateral arrangement.
We extend our analysis to other CSA portfolios. The results hold across different CSA
counterparties and collateral agreements. Our findings show that collateral posting can reduce credit risk
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and CVA. The results also suggest a negative correlation between collateralization and CVA as an
increase in collateralization causes a decrease in CVA charge and vice-versa. These findings improve our
understanding of the relationship between collateralization and CVA.

Impact of collateralization on market risk
We study how collateralization impacts market risk by gauging VaR changes due to collateral
arrangements. VaR is the regulatory measurement for assessing market risk. It is defined as the maximum
loss likely to be suffered on a portfolio for a given probability defined as a confidence level over a given
period time. In its most general form, VaR measures 10-day 99th percentile of potential loss that can be
incurred.
There are three commonly used methodologies to calculate VaR – parametric, historical
simulation and Monte Carlo simulation. Parametric model estimates VaR directly from the standard
deviation of portfolio returns typically assuming returns are normally distributed. Historical simulation
calculates VaR from the distribution of actual historical returns. Whilst Monte Carlo simulation computes
VaR from a distribution constructed from random outcomes. In this paper, we calculate historical VaR.
For monitoring market risk, many organizations segment portfolios in some manner. They may
do so by traders and trading desks. Typically, a market risk portfolio contains derivatives across multiple
counterparties, while a counterparty portfolio comprises transactions among different traders and trading
desks. We fortuitously select a trading portfolio and then partition it into single-counterparty subportfolios. One sub-portfolio contains 172 interest rate swaps, 68 caps and floors, 25 European swaptions
and 17 cancelable swaps.
First, we compute the VaR of the sub-portfolio without considering credit risk. The calculated
result as of May 11, 2012 is -386,570. Here the VaR is a negative value by definition. However, the
industry convention is to report VaR as a positive number that is the amount of money one can lose. Thus,
people in the market usually say that the VaR is 386,570 in this case. This convention can be confusing in
places. If one says that VaR increases, the numbers actually become smaller or move into the left tail.
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For many reasons, both historical and practical, market and credit risk have often been treated as
if they are unrelated source of risk: the risk types have been measured separately, managed separately,
and economic capital against each risk type has been assessed separately.
However, market risk and credit risk actually reinforce each other. Default-induced credit losses
can be driven by market price changes. At the same time, the changes in prices depend on the rating
migration or increase in the default perception of the firm. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(see BCBS [2009]) also finds that those banks that were more severely affected in the global financial
crisis measured their market and credit risk separately, whereas banks that used an integrated approach to
market and credit risk measurement were much less impacted. Measuring market risk without considering
credit risk may mask the significant impact of credit risk and often leads to underestimation of risk.
Therefore, we further calculate VaR by taking credit risk into account. Let us first assume that
there is no CSA agreement. Each trade is valued by the risky model developed by Xiao [2015]. The VaR
with credit risk is computed as -418,948. It can be seen that VaR has increased from 386,570 to 418,948
after accounting for credit risk. The above empirical results show that market fluctuation has a larger
impact on VaR when credit risk is taken into account. Our research highlights the linkage between market
and credit risk.
Next, we measure VaR again by considering both counterparty credit risk and collateralization.
Assume that there is a CSA arrangement. The VaR values under different effective collateral thresholds
are displayed in Exhibit 10.

Exhibit 10. Impact of Collateralization on VaR
This exhibit shows that VaR increases with collateral threshold. The infinite collateral threshold is
equivalent to no collateral agreement and the zero-value collateral threshold corresponds to full
collateralization.
Effective Threshold

0

2.1 Million

4.1 Million

VaR

-386,570

-398,235

-404,401

6.1 Mil
-410,756

Infinite (  )
-418,950
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Exhibit 10 tells us that collateral posting actually can reduce VaR. The results show that market
risk exposure rises as collateral threshold increases. In particular, VaR reaches the maximum when the
threshold is infinite representing no collateral arrangement. We come to the same conclusion after
repeating this test for other portfolios.
Our findings suggest that there are important interactions between market and credit risk. We find
a positive correlation between market and credit risk as they increase or decrease together. We also find
that collateralization is actually negatively correlated with market risk, i.e., an increase in collateralization
causes a drop in market risk. Said differently, collateral posting can reduce market risk. Our research
contributes to the understanding of the interaction between market and credit risk.

Conclusion
This article addresses an important topic of the impact of collateralization on valuation and risk.
We present a new model for pricing collateralized financial contracts based on the fundamental principal
and legal structure of CSA. The model can back out market prices. This is very useful for pricing
outstanding collateralized derivatives.
Empirically, we use a unique proprietary dataset to measure the effect of collateralization on
pricing and compare it with model-implied prices. The empirical results show that the model-implied
prices are quite close to the market-quoted prices, suggesting that the model is fairly accurate on pricing
collateralized derivatives.
We find strong evidence that counterparty credit risk alone plays a significant but not
overwhelming role in determining credit-related spreads. Only the joint effect of collateralization and
credit risk has high explanatory power on unsecured credit costs. This finding suggests that failure to
properly account for collateralization may result in significant mispricing of derivatives.
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We also find evidence that there is a strong linkage between market and credit risk. Our research
results suggest that banks and regulators need to think about an integrated framework to capture material
interactions of these two types of risk. This requires all profits and losses are gauged in a consistent way
across risk types as they tend to be driven by the same economic factors. Our finding leads to an
improved understanding of the interaction between market and credit risk and how this interaction is
related to risk measurement and management.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The binomial default rule considers only two possible states: default or
survival. For a discrete one-payment period (t , T ) economy, at time T, the contract either defaults with
the default probability q (t , T ) or survives with the survival probability p(t , T ) . The survival value is the
promised payoff X T and the default payment is C (T )   (T ) X T  C (T ) . The value of this collateralized
contract is the discounted expectation of all the payoffs and is given by
V C (t )  ED(t , T )q(t , T )C (T )   (T )( X T  C (T ))  p(t , T ) X T  Ft



(A1)

The collateral posted at time t is defined in (5). The value of the collateral at time T becomes
C (T )  C (t ) / D(t , T ) , where we consider the time value of money only for collateral assets.

If V C (t )  H (t ) , we have C (t )  V C (t )  H (t ) and
V C (t )  V N (t ) / I (t , T )  H (t )q (t , T )1   (T ) / I (t , T )

(A2)

where I (t , T )  D(t , T ) p(t , T )   (T )q(t , T ) , I (t , T )  EI (t , T ) Ft  , and V N (t )  E I (t , T ) X T Ft  .
In this case, V C (t )  H (t ) is equivalent to V N (t )  H (t ) .
If V C (t )  H (t ) , we have C (t )  0 and
V C (t )  V N (t )  H (t )

(A3)

Combining the two cases of V C (t )  H (t ) and V C (t )  H (t ) , we get
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V C (t )  1V N (t ) H (t ) V N (t )  1V N (t ) H (t ) V N (t ) / I (t , T )  H (t )q (t , T )1   (T ) / I (t , T )



(A4)

or





V C (t )  E F (t , T ) X T Ft  G (t , T )

(A5a)



(A5b)

where



F (t, T )  1V N (t )H (t )  1V N (t )H (t ) / I (t, T ) I (t , T ) D(t, T )
G(t , T )  1V N (t )H (t ) H (t )q (t , T )1   (T ) / I (t , T )

Proof of Proposition 2: Let t  T0 . On the first payment day

(A5c)

T1 , let V C (T1 ) denote the CSA

value of the contract excluding the current cash flow X 1 . According to Proposition 1, the CSA value of
the contract at t is given by





 







V C (t )  E F (T0 , T1 ) X 1  V C (T1 ) Ft  G(T0 , T1 )

(A6)

Similarly, we have



V C (T1 )  E F (T1 , T2 ) X 2  V C (T2 ) F T1  G(T1 , T2 )

(A7)

Note that F (T0 , T1 ) and G(T0 , T1 ) are F T 1 -measurable. According to the taking out what is
known and tower properties of conditional expectation, we have





 

V C (t )  E F (T0 , T1 ) X 1  V C (T1 ) Ft  G (T0 , T1 )



i 1





 





 i 1 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) X i Ft  E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) V C (T2 ) Ft
2



i 1



1



 i 0 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) G (Ti , Ti 1 ) Ft
1





(A8)

By recursively deriving from T2 forward over Tm , where V C (Tm )  X m , we obtain



i 1







m 1



i 1





V C (t )  i 1 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) X i Ft  i 0 E  j 0 F (T j , T j 1 ) G (Ti , Ti 1 ) Ft
m

where



i 1
j 0



(A9)

F (T j , T j 1 )  1 is an empty product when i  0 .
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